The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law by Smith, D. Gordon
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Faculty Scholarship
12-31-2008
The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law
D. Gordon Smith
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, and the Business
Organizations Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
D. Gordon Smith, ??? ????????? ????????? ?? ????????? ???, 57 Eᴍᴏʀʏ L. J. 985 (2008).
RESPONSE: THE DYSTOPIAN POTENTIAL OF CORPORATE
LAW
D. Gordon Smith*
INTRODUCTION
Julian West was born a Boston Brahmin in 1857. At age 29, he was
engaged to be married to Edith Bartlett, whom he described as wealthy,
beautiful, and graceful. Their marriage awaited only the completion of a new
house, which West was attempting to build in "one of the most desirable parts
of the city, that is to say, a part chiefly inhabited by the rich."1 Although West
owned his own home, it was, in his words, "not a house to which I could think
of bringing a bride, much less so dainty a one as Edith Bartlett.",2  But
construction on the new house had been repeatedly delayed by labor strikes.
Later recounting his frustration at these strikes, West wrote:
What the specific causes of these strikes were I do not remember.
Strikes had become so common at that period that people had ceased
to inquire into their particular grounds. In one department of
industry or another, they had been nearly incessant ever since the
great business crisis of 1873. In fact, it had come to be the
exceptional thing to see any class of laborers pursue their avocation
steadily for more than a few months at a time.
3
On the evening of May 30, 1887-after spending the day with Edith and
her family-West retired to his home. He was exhausted after suffering from
insomnia the previous two nights. So severe was his affliction that he had built
a secret, soundproof chamber under the foundations. Even this extreme
measure, however, sometimes failed to produce the desired results. On these
occasions, West solicited the assistance of Doctor Pillsbury, a self-proclaimed
"Professor of Animal Magnetism." 4  Doctor Pillsbury had the ability to
* Glenn L. Farr Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. Thanks to
Rachel Graham and Kim Smith for research assistance.
1 EDWARD BELLAMY, LOOKING BACKWARD 7 (Dover Publications 1996) (1888).
2 Id. at 10.
' Id. at 7.
4 Id. at 11.
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"mesmerize" West, placing him in a "deep slumber, which continued until [he]
was aroused by a reversal of the mesmerizing process." 5 On this particular
night, West asked his servant to summon Doctor Pillsbury, who came only
reluctantly because his was preparing to leave Boston that very night to pursue
a new professional opportunity in New Orleans. Nevertheless, Doctor
Pillsbury visited West, who submitted to the treatment after giving instructions
to his servant to be awakened at 9:00 a.m. the next morning.
When West was finally awakened, he did not see the face of his servant,
but the face of a stranger, who identified himself as Dr. Leete. West found
himself in a house he had never before seen and when he demanded an
explanation, the reluctant Dr. Leete told him that the date was September 10,
2000. West had slept for 133 years, three months, and eleven days.
West's tale appears in Looking Backward, a novel by Edward Bellamy,
first published in 1888. Looking Backward describes Bellamy's utopian vision
through West's eyes as he explores the differences between Boston in the year
2000 and the Boston of his youth. Much of the book recounts conversations
between West and Dr. Leete, an educated and inquisitive man who gradually
introduces West to the strange new world. West also occasionally ventures out
to see the new world with Dr. Leete's beautiful daughter, Edith.6
In Bellamy's utopia, West finds a society in which everyone is equal, not
only in material wealth, but also in dignity. It is a world with clean air
(because people no longer use combustion to heat their homes), no jails (for
"lying has gone out of fashion" 7), and no military organizations (because the
"civilized" world is united in a great economic community). There are no
taxes because there is no private property; everything, beyond limited personal
effects, is owned by the national government. (Note that it is not a "federal"
government, because the states have been eliminated.) The national
government exists primarily to direct the affairs of the nation's industrial
operations, and for this function, there is no need for lawyers. Accordingly,
Bellamy-who labored for a brief time as a practicing attorney-eliminates
them completely. After all, in the words of Dr. Leete, "It would not seem
reasonable ... in a case where the only interest of the nation is to find out the
5 id.
6 Late in the book, it is revealed that Edith is the great-granddaughter of Edith Bartlett, who had
reluctantly married another after the supposed death of her fianc6 in a house fire.
7 Id. at 203.
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truth, that persons should take part in the proceedings who had an
acknowledged motive to color it."
8
The persistent question that occupies Julian West throughout the novel is
how this utopia could have been achieved without a basic change in human
nature. When West entered the state of suspended animation in 1887, the
problem consuming American society was the "labor question"-that is, the
problem of reconciling employers and workers.9 Dr. Leete, living in a world
after the labor question had been resolved, analyzes the problem with
admirable simplicity. According to Dr. Leete, the labor question arose in the
nineteenth century because of the unprecedented concentration of capital,
which displaced numerous entrepreneurial businesses and replaced them with
"great corporations."' 0 The rise of these great corporations could not be
curtailed, despite popular opposition, because "even its victims.., were forced
to admit the prodigious increase of efficiency which had been imparted to the
national industries, the vast economies effected by concentration of
management and unity of organization, and to confess that since the new
system had taken the place of the old the wealth of the world had increased at a
rate before undreamed of.""
Dr. Leete's account seems strangely contradictory. On the one hand,
corporations caused resentment because they forced people who previously
had been able to survive independently to subject themselves to the whim of
the great capitalists. On the other hand, those same people acknowledged the
power of the great corporations to improve their lives (to dismantle the great
corporations "would have involved returning to the day of stage-coaches" 12),
and thus they would not attempt to turn back the clock. The problem, quite
simply, was a distributional one: "[T]he vast increase had gone chiefly to make
the rich richer, increasing the gap between them and the poor."'
' 3
What West learns under the tutelage of Dr. Leete is that people have not
fundamentally changed, but rather that the structure of society has changed.
Somehow, while West slept, society had made a conscious decision to pursue
equality with full conviction. The public policy that ushered in this new era
was nationalization of all industry. Dr. Leete describes the "logical
8 Id. at 99.
9 See BELLAMY, supra note 1, at 23.
'o Id. at 25.
I' ld. at 26.
12 Id..
13 Id. at 27.
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evolution"'14 from a capitalist society, in which industry was increasingly
concentrated, to a nationalized economy that would "open a golden future to
humanity"I1:
Early in the last century the evolution was completed by the final
consolidation of the entire capital of the nation. The industry and
commerce of the country, ceasing to be conducted by a set of
irresponsible corporations and syndicates of private persons at their
caprice and for their profit, were intrusted [sic] to a single syndicate
representing the people, to be conducted for the common interest for
the common profit. The nation, that is to say, organized as the one
great business corporation in which all other corporations were
absorbed; it became the one capitalist in the place of all other
capitalists, the sole employer, the final monopoly in which all
previous and lesser monopolies were swallowed up, a monopoly in
the profits and economies of which all citizens shared.
16
Looking Backward was a publishing bonanza, selling 300,000 copies in its
second year of publication. 17  In the wake of its publication, Bellamy
Nationalist Clubs formed across the United States, and though the nationalist
movement fizzled by the mid-1890s, Bellamy's vision of corporations brought
to heel by the government left an enduring mark on the American psyche. In
1935, Charles Beard, John Dewey, and Edward Weeks each listed Looking
Backward as the second most influential book written since 1885, behind only
Das Kapital.1 s
As one of the major works addressing the role of corporations in society
during the Gilded Age, 19 Looking Backward serves as a marker by which to
measure the progress of the "corporate social responsibility" (CSR) movement.
In some ways, the modem version of CSR seems light years from Bellamy's
nationalization nightmare, as CSR scholarship has become increasingly
diverse and sophisticated. 21 Nevertheless, CSR remains tightly focused on
14 Id.
15 BELLAMY, supra note 1, at 27.
16 id.
17 1 JOHN FOSTER KIRK, ALLIBONE'S CRITICAL DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE AND BRITISH AND
AMERICAN AUTHORS 126 (Supp. 1892).
18 DONALD C. HODGES, AMERICA'S NEW ECONOMIC ORDER 15 (1996).
19 See MARK TWAIN & CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER, THE GILDED AGE: A TALE OF TODAY (1873) (using
the term "Gilded Age" to characterize the period in the late nineteenth century during which-the rise of "big
business" occurred).
20 For a recent "business ethnography" of the CSR movement, see John M. Conley & Cynthia A.
Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility
Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1 (2005).
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the notion that "the legitimate concerns of a corporation should include such
broader objectives as sustainable growth, equitable employment practices, and
long-term social and environmental well-being." 22 For reformers who choose
corporate law as their workshop, the list of potential targets that might achieve
those ends is short.
Kent Greenfield has written meaningfully about corporate law from a CSR
perspective for many years.23 His recent book, The Failure of Corporate Law:
Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities, will cement his reputation
as one of the most creative proponents of "progressive corporate law. ' 24 In the
companion piece to this Essay, Professor Greenfield relies on new insights
from organizational and regulatory theory to bolster his claim that corporate
25law needs fundamental reform.
In the following sections, I respond to Professor Greenfield's challenge to
traditional corporate law. Part I describes the scope of my inquiry, defining
"corporate law" as essentially about the structure of corporate decisionmaking.
Part II observes that reformers like Professor Greenfield have only two options
for changing corporate decisionmaking: changing the decisionmaker or
changing the decision rule. I contend that the existence of powerful product
markets, capital markets, and managerial labor markets restricts the options of
corporate decisionmakers, thus frustrating attempts to materially alter the
substance of corporate actions. Finally, Part III considers a potential dark side
of corporate reforms. While Part II suggests that changing the decisionmaker
21 See, e.g., Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multi-Level
Theory of Social Change in Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836 (2007). The article describes using a
model relying on "theories of mico-level organizational justice, meso-level corporate governance, and macro-
level varieties of capitalisms" to analyze CSR. Id. at 837.
22 Conley & Williams, supra note 20, at 1-2.
23 See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate Law, I HASTINGS Bus. L. 89 (2005)
(discussing principles for corporate governance); Kent Greenfield, An Experimental Test of Fairness Under
Agency and Profit-Maximization Constraints (With Notes on Implications for Corporate Governance), 71
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983 (2003) (analyzing the effect of agency on negotiation in a corporate director-
shareholder context); Kent Greenfield, There's a Forest in Those Trees: Teaching About the Role of
Corporations in Society, 34 GA. L. REV. 1011 (2000) (arguing that law professors should focus on a
corporation's role in society when teaching corporate law).
24 See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE
POSSIBILITIES (2007). "Progressive corporate law" coalesced around a conference and subsequent book by
that title. See PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW, at ix (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
25 See generally Kent Greenfield, Proposition: Saving the World with Corporate Law?, 57 EMORY L.J.
947 (2008).
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or changing the decision rule would have little or no effect on corporate
actions, Part III explores the dystopian potential of corporate law reform.
26
I. THE IRREDUCIBLE CORE OF CORPORATE LAW
What is corporate law? Legal scholars often describe corporations by
reference to a handful of legal characteristics: legal personality, limited
liability, transferable shares, delegated management, and investor ownership. 27
One might reasonably conclude, therefore, that "corporate law" consists of the
set of rules that create and sustain those characteristics.
While this conception of "corporate law" might be useful in defining a
course of study or the scope of a treatise, a more austere definition will focus
our analysis. Professor Greenfield is on the right track when he observes,
"Corporate law determines the rules governing the organization, purposes, and
limitations of some of the largest and most powerful institutions in the
world.' '28 Pared to its core, "corporate law" is the set of rules that defines the
decisionmaking structure of corporations.29  Or, invoking Melvin Eisenberg's
memorable maxim, "corporate law is constitutional law." 30
26 The word "dystopia" is usually credited to John Stuart Mill. See, e.g., RICHARD C.S. TRAHAIR,
UTOPIAS AND UTOPIANS: AN HISTORICAL DICTIONARY 110 (1999).
27 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 17-19 (Reinier R. Kraakman et al. eds.,
2004).
28 Greenfield, supra note 25, at 6.
29 Cf. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L.
REV. 542, 546-47 (1990) ("1 define 'corporate law' to include laws-whether made by legislators, judges, or
regulators-that primarily govern the relationship between a company's managers and investors"); Eric W.
Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1577-78 (1993)
("Corporate law, like most law, is primarily about the rule-oriented structuring of social power, and it is
specifically about the rules that structure the organization of economic power. Corporate law is primarily
concerned with business, that is, the structure of economic power in the form of its institutions and processes.
Its subject is not primarily economics, although economic policy must obviously play a central role in the
development of corporate law. The most basic rules of corporate law involve the structure and governance of
businesses that 'incorporate,' which means simply filing with a state government 'founding documents'
(usually a certificate of incorporation and any required supporting documents). Beyond the ministerial
requirements of the founding act, corporate law also structures and, at least to a certain extent, circumscribes
the activities of incorporated businesses and the participants associated with them. Moreover, the powers and
restrictions of corporate law are formulated with a view (at least in theory) toward achieving a set of rules for
incorporated businesses that conduce to the public advantage.").
30 MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 1(1976).
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The rules that define the decisionmaking structure of corporations are both
"power-conferring" and "duty-imposing.' '31 The locus of power in the
corporation is the board of directors, which possesses a "large reservoir of
authority. ' 32  In a typical corporation, much of this management authority is
delegated to officers, though the extent of such delegations is regulated more
by custom than by positive corporate law. 33
The board of directors exercises its authority subject to the will of the
shareholders, who are entitled to determine the composition of the board.34 In
addition to electing and removing directors, shareholders must approve certain
fundamental transactions. 35 These voting rights, coupled with limited financial
36 37rights, the right to sue derivatively, and the right to transfer shares without
prior approval,38 comprise the statutory rights of shareholders vis-a-vis the
corporation. Though this array of rights may seem substantial on paper,
impediments to effective shareholder governance have been extensively
catalogued and debated.39
31 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 40-41 (1961). Eric Orts employed this dichotomy in his
excellent discussion of complexity in corporate law. See Orts, supra note 29, at 1565.
32 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953 (Del. 1985) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 14 1(a) (2007) ("The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed
by or under the direction of a board of directors .... ")).
33 Provisions relating to officers are scant in modem corporation statutes, and the provisions that exist
allow tremendous flexibility in defining the titles, duties, and other terms of office. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 142 (2007) (providing that the titles and duties of the officers are to be determined in accordance with
bylaws or a resolution of the board of directors).
3, See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (b) (2007) (election); Id. § 141(k) (removal).
35 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2007) (amending corporate charter); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 10.03
(2007) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2007) (approving mergers); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 11.03
(1999) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (2007) (approving sales of assets not in the ordinary course of
business); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 12.02 (2007) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275(b) (2007) (approving
dissolution); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 14.01 (2007) (same).
36 Common stock possesses the "residual claim" against the corporation's assets. Absent special
arrangements in the corporate charter or extreme circumstances, however, holders of common stock are not
entitled to receive dividends. The corporation statute gives the board of directors almost complete discretion
over the declaration of dividends. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (2007).
37 Id. § 327.
38 See Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role:
"Sacred Space" in Corporate Transactions, 80 TEx. L. REV. 261, 304 (2001) ("State corporations codes do
not see the need to specify this basic right of property, but it is implicit in statutory provisions regulating
restrictions on share transfer.") (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202 (1991)).
39 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833,
836 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power] (arguing that increased shareholder power
would reduce governance problems); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1735 (2006) (advocating limited empowerment of shareholders in
corporate governance); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to
Bebchuk's Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759 (2006) (arguing for a balance
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The rules of corporate law that constitute the board of directors, officers,
and shareholders and allocate authority among them are the "power-
conferring" rules. The "duty-imposing" rules limit the exercise of authority,
partly through substantive constraints, but mostly through procedural
constraints.
Substantive statutory constraints on board power have largely been
abandoned or eviscerated in modem corporation statutes. In their landmark
1932 book, The Modem Corporation and Private Property, Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means lamented the passing of such provisions from nineteenth-
century corporation codes. 4 0 Vestiges remain, such as provisions regarding
corporate "powers '4 1 and "purposes" 42 or the regulation of "legal capital,
' 43
but these provisions impose no important constraints on corporate decision
making."
between shareholder involvement and traditional corporate board power); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Reply: Letting
Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1784 (2006) (discussing ways to let shareholders more actively
participate in corporate decisionmaking).
40 ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119-
40(1932).
41 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 121, 122 (2007).
42 Id. § 102(a)(3).
41 Id. §§ 154, 160, 170.
44 The power of the board of directors may be limited by a corporation's constitutional documents. See,
e.g., id. § 102(b)(l) (allowing the certificate of incorporation to contain "any provision for the management of
the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provision creating, defining, limiting
and regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors, and the stockholders... if such provisions are not
contrary to the laws of this State"); id. § 109(b) (authorizing bylaws that "contain any provision, not
inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of the corporation, the
conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or
employees"). The extent to which shareholders are allowed to limit the authority of the board of directors
through shareholder-adopted bylaws remains an open question in Delaware. For thorough discussions of this
issue, see Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY
Bus. L.J. 205 (2005); and Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-
Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TuL. L. REV. 409, 428-33 (1998).
In 2006, the Delaware legislature adopted amendments to title 8, section 216, of the Delaware Code,
providing in relevant part, "A bylaw amendment adopted by stockholders which specifies the votes that shall
be necessary for the election of directors shall not be further amended or repealed by the board of directors."
The synopsis of the bill expressly limited the effect of this amendment to section 216, thus leaving open the
general issue of the viability of shareholder-adopted bylaws:
Section 5 Amends § 216 to provide that a bylaw adopted by a vote of stockholders that prescribes
the required vote for the election of directors may not be altered or repealed by the board of
directors. This amendment does not address any other situation in which the board of directors
amends a bylaw adopted by stockholder vote.
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In modem corporation statutes, the most important constraints on director
power are procedural, not substantive. In broad brush, good procedure
requires unbiased directors45  who consider "all material information
reasonably available." 46  Shareholders frequently contest director elections,
47 48
claiming procedural flaws, both under state law and federal securities laws.
In addition to technical requirements of statutes and regulations, courts impose
on directors duties of care, loyalty, and good faith, all of which are primarily
procedural duties.49
Viewed as a whole, the "power-conferring" and "duty-imposing" rules
discussed above-along with the ancillary rules regulating the formation of the
corporation°-50 are the rules that comprise "corporate law." Professor
Greenfield believes that we can change the world for the better by improving
these rules. More specifically, he focuses on board composition and
shareholder primacy.51 In the ensuing Parts, I will argue that changes in
corporate law cannot eradicate poverty or materially change existing
distributions of wealth, except by impairing the creation of wealth. Changes in
corporate law will not clean our air or our water. And changes in corporate
law will not solve the labor question. Indeed, the only changes in corporate
law that will have a substantial effect on such issues are changes that will make
the world worse, not better.
52
45 The concept of "bias" in corporate law traditionally has been framed in terms of "independence" and
"disinterestedness." See, e.g., In re Tele-Communications, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2005 WL 3642727 (Del. Ch.
2005) ("In order to rebut the presumption of director disinterestedness and independence, a stockholder must
show that the directors' self-interest materially affected their independence.").
46 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 (Del. 2000).
47 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 225 (2007); see also Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The
New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 169-70
(2004) (describing "expedited statutory proceedings," including proceedings under section 225, in the
Delaware courts).
48 Federal securities law contains rules regulating disclosure and proxy voting in director elections. See,
e.g., Securities and Exchange Act Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2007) (stating the various
requirements and disclosures that must be filed with the SEC for proxy voting).
49 For an extensive discussion of each of these duties, see In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation,
906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006). The Disney case is particularly important for the definition of "good faith,"
which is the duty that comes closest to embodying substantive constraints on the board of directors. The
Disney court described the duty of good faith as a duty to avoid intentional infliction of harm on the
corporation, intentional violations of law, and intentional derelictions of duty. See id. at 67. In each case, the
cited wrong requires "intentional" action by the directors, thus making the inquiry essentially procedural.
50 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-110 (2007).
51 See generally Greenfield, supra note 25.
52 1 do not argue that corporate law is trivial in any meaningful sense. Cf Black, supra note 29, at 544
("After a century of erosion through competition for corporate charters, what is left of state corporate law is an
empty shell that has form but no content."). On this issue, I am in agreement with Eric Orts:
2008]
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II. DOES CORPORATE LAW MATTER?
This question lies at the heart of my disagreement with Professor
Greenfield, who proclaims, "Corporate law is a big deal. 53  Ask most
corporate governance scholars whether corporate law matters, and you risk
receiving a disquisition on the connection between corporate law and stock
price or profitability. 54  For Professor Greenfield, by contrast, the question of
whether corporate law matters triggers a more expansive inquiry about the
effect of corporate actions on labor relations, the environment, and human
rights.55
If corporate law is fundamentally about the process of corporate
decisionmaking, as asserted above, possible strategies for reform are twofold:
(1) changing the decisionmaker (Professor Greenfield's reform efforts are
aimed at the board of directors, though recent work on increasing the role of
shareholders also speak to this issue56); or (2) changing the decision rule (the
"shareholder primacy norm"). Like other aspiring reformers before him,
Professor Greenfield explores both options. To sustain his claim that
"corporate law is a big deal, 57 Professor Greenfield must persuade us not only
that changing the composition of the board of directors or changing the
Even if Black's "triviality hypothesis" proved correct, corporate law would nonetheless remain
important. Even if corporate law were entirely enabling, it would describe the rules by which
economic power is socially structured, which is not a trivial matter, although corporate law
would then collapse into a specialized category of contract and property law.
Orts, supra note 29, at 1582.
53 Greenfield, supra note 25, at 950.
54 See, e.g., Craig A. Peterson & Norman W. Hawker, Does Corporate Law Matter? Legal Capital
Restrictions on Stock Distributions, 31 AKRON L. REV. 175 (1997) (discussing how stock dividends may effect
the shareholder-board relationship). The slightly broader question "Does corporate governance matter?"-
has triggered an important set of studies at the intersection of law and finance. See, e.g., Bernard Black, Does
Corporate Governance Matter? A Crude Test Using Russian Data, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2131 (2001) (analyzing
the relationship between corporate governance and market value); Mark S. Klock et al., Does Corporate
Governance Matter to Bondholders?, 40 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 693 (2005) (examining the relationship
between the cost of debt financing and corporate governance).
55 See Greenfield, supra note 25, at 950 ("By establishing the obligations and priorities of companies and
their management, corporate law affects everything from the return on shareholder equity, to employees' wage
rates (whether in Silicon Valley or Bangladesh), to whether companies will try to skirt environmental laws, to
whether they will tend to look the other way when doing business with governments that violate human
rights.").
56 See, e.g., Bebchuk, Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 39, (arguing for a corporate governance
approach that allows shareholders to change a corporation's charter); Thompson & Smith, supra note 38
(arguing for direct shareholder action to resolve takeover disputes).
57 Greenfield, supra note 25, at 950.
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shareholder primacy norm would alter corporate decisionmaking but also that
the new decisions would be better for society as a whole than the old
decisions.58  In this Part II, I argue that Professor Greenfield's proposed
changes would not materially alter corporate decision making, and in Part III, I
argue that forcing material changes through corporate law reform would
decrease societal wealth. Like other would-be reformers, Professor Greenfield
runs smack into Adam Smith's invisible hand.
59
A. Changing the Decisionmaker
As noted above, the problem that was consuming Julian West when he
went into a trance in 1887 was the "labor question." 6°  Professor Greenfield
tells a similar story about modem employees, even though, like the people of
Julian West's youth, Professor Greenfield is forced to acknowledge the
"prodigious ... efficiency ' 6 1 with which corporations operate. 62 Indeed, like
Edward Bellamy, Professor Greenfield wants to "take advantage of the unique
capabilities of the corporation to achieve important gains in social welfare."
63
Rather than nationalizing corporations, however, Professor Greenfield would
prefer to change the composition of the board of directors to include
representatives of a broad range of corporate stakeholders. 64
58 Larry Ribstein appropriately frames the issue as follows: "The relevant issue ... is not whether
markets force shareholder-maximizing managers to maximize social wealth. Rather the question is whether
permitting firms to contract to make managers accountable to shareholder leads to greater social wealth than
forcing them to serve nonshareholder stakeholders." Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in
Corporate Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1444 (2006).
59 See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
(1776) (introducing the concept of the invisible hand).
60 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
61 See BELLAMY, supra note 1, at 26.
62 See Greenfield, supra note 25, at 948 ("Corporations are also immensely successful at creating
financial wealth. They represent the world's most successful business form for facilitating a cooperative
process of investment by numerous stakeholders, who unite through the corporate entity to organize their
various resources to produce goods or services for profitable exchange.").
63 Greenfield, supra note 25, at 974.
64 Professor Greenfield cleverly turns economic analysis against its practitioners:
The stakeholder board, in an ironic sense, is a genuine realization of the "nexus of contracts"
view of the firm. If the firm is best seen as a microcosm of the market, then let us be honest
about recognizing all contracts by putting the most important market participants in a position
where they can be heard at the decisionmaking level of the firm. The specifics will be difficult,
but not impossible: employees could elect a proportion of the board; communities in which the
company employs a significant percentage of the workforce could be asked to propose a
representative for the board; long-term business partners and creditors could be represented as
well.
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Professor Greenfield's proposal is reminiscent of Abram Chayes's 1959
proposal to allow non-shareholder constituencies to participate in "[t]heir
rightful share in decisions on the exercise of corporate power" by electing
representatives to the board of directors. 65  While Professor Greenfield
reassures us that "specifics will be difficult, but not impossible," 66 Ralph Nader
was not so sanguine: "It seems impossible to design a general 'interest group'
formula which will assure that all affected constituencies of large industrial
corporations will be represented and that all constituencies will be given
appropriate weight."
67
Even if the logistics of this proposal could be worked out, the likelihood
that it would substantially alter corporate decisionmaking is vanishingly small.
The obstacle to change is markets. Lots of markets: product markets, capital
68markets, managerial labor markets. While changes in the composition of the
board of directors may have some marginal effects on corporate
decisionmaking, market forces severely constrain the range of options
available to the boards of large, publicly traded companies. 69  Of particular
relevance to the current discussion, powerful capital and takeover markets
provide strong incentives for corporate managers to maximize profits.
The available evidence strongly suggests that changing the structure of
corporate decisionmaking to provide greater voice to non-shareholder
constituencies would not significantly change the profit-maximizing
orientation of those firms. For example, labor unions acting as shareholder
activists in the 1990s were a "model for any large institutional investor
Greenfield, supra note 25, at 980.
65 Abram Chayes, The Modem Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN
SOCIETY 40-41 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1959).
66 Greenfield, supra note 25, at 980.
67 RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 124 (1976). Nader and his coauthors
proposed instead that each director be given "a separate oversight responsibility, a separate expertise, and a
separate constituency so that each public concern would be guaranteed at least one informed representative on
the board." Id. at 125. While modem boards of directors typically do not include a director who is expressly
identified as an expert on "employee welfare" or "consumer protection," they do include "financial experts,"
who comprise the audit committee. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407, 15 U.S.C. § 7265 (2006).
68 For an attempt to illustrate how these markets combine to exert pressure on corporate decisionmaking,
see D. Gordon Smith, Corporate Governance and Managerial Incompetence: Lessons From Kmart, 74 N.C.
L. REV. 1037 (1996).
69 On the power and efficacy of markets to produce socially desirable outcomes, see Ribstein, supra note
58, at 1442-60.
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attempting to maximize return on capital. '7° Similarly, employee ownership
has failed to transform large, publicly traded companies.
71
Professor Greenfield invokes the German model of codetermination, under
which employees of large German corporations elect one-half of the
supervisory board, despite the absence of persuasive evidence that
codetermination changes corporate decisionmaking. Codetermination has been
widely studied among corporate governance scholars, particularly in recent
years, as the European Union (EU) has endeavored to harmonize company law
72among the member-states. As the EU prepares for the possibility of charter
competition,73 debates about the German model have escalated in intensity, but
evidence regarding the effect of codetermination on corporate decisionmaking
is "notoriously ambiguous. 74
Professor Greenfield also emphasizes racial, ethnic, and gender diversity as
a means of changing the decisionmaker. He defends diversity on instrumental
grounds: "Adding perspectives other than those of rich, white men will almost
certainly improve the quality of business decisions made by the board.,
75
Professor Greenfield is not the first to link board diversity with improved
corporate decisionmaking, 76 even though evidence supporting this link is
70 Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by
Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1020 (1998).
71 See Steve Sleigh, Book Review, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 215 (2002). Sleigh offers the following as
a stylized view of "a big, publicly traded, highly visible firm that is majority-owned by its employees":
The reality is that labor-management relations were not transformed by employee ownership, but
remain in a steady state of ongoing strife. This is due to a number of factors, not the least of
which is an industry-wide culture of conflict, and class and gender distinctions among various
union-represented groups. In and of itself, employee ownership barely raises its head as an issue
except at shareholder meetings. Indeed, while employees collectively own over have [sic] of the
common stock, the real control of the company is still exerted by a small handful of senior
executives, bankers, and other companies who act as both suppliers of capital goods and
operating money.
Id. at 215-16.
72 With regard to harmonization efforts in the European Union, see Communication of the European
Communities, Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union-A
Plan to Move Forward, COM (2003) 284 final (May 21, 2003); Commission Recommendation (EC) No.
162/2005 of 15 Feb. 2005, 2005 O.J. (L 52/51)..
73 Jens C. Dammann, Note, The Future of Codetermination After Centros: Will German Corporate Law
Move Closer to the U.S. Model?, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 607 (2003).
74 Christine Windbichler, Cheers and Boos for Employee hivolvement: Co-determination as Corporate
Governance Conundrum, 6 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. 507, 510 (2005).
75 Greenfield, supra note 25, at 982.
76 See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors,
76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1403 (2002); Lisa M. Fairfax, Clogs in the Pipeline: The Mixed Data on Women
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mixed, at best. 77  These arguments raise an obvious question: If diversity is
value-enhancing, why don't corporations pursue a policy of diversity
voluntarily? One possibility is the so-called "pool problem." 78  Another
possibility is that entrenched incumbents receive private benefits from the
status quo or are motivated by a desire to exclude women or racial or ethnic
minorities. Of course, a third possibility is that diversity is not value-
enhancing.
Professor Greenfield's reliance on business rationales to support his
argument for diversity is surprising, given his general willingness to eschew
business rationales in favor of other considerations, such as social justice. I
suspect that Professor Greenfield views increased diversity as inherently good,
even though he feels obliged to defend his proposal on efficiency grounds.
Interestingly, on traditional measures of corporate social responsibility, board
diversity appears to be ineffectual.79 Moreover, the benefits inherent in board
diversity may be diluted by linking diversity with business outcomes. Lisa
Fairfax has recently concluded that business rationales for racial and ethnic
diversity "promise more-and in some cases significantly more-than
directors of color can realistically deliver." 80 As a result, using the business
Directors and Continued Barriers to Their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV. 579, 590-91 (2006); Marleen A.
O'Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233. 1306-07 (2003); Steven A.
Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. J.L. BuS. & FIN. 85, 90-105 (2000); Steven A. Ramirez, A
Flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley Reform: Can Diversity in the Boardroom Quell Corporate Corruption?, 77 ST.
JOHN's L. REV. 837, 846-57 (2003); Janis Sarra, The Gender Implications of Corporate Governance Change,
I SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 457, 477-81 (2002).
77 Proponents of diversity can point to one study showing a correlation between number of women or
people of color on a corporation's board and firm value as measured by Tobin's q. See David A. Carter et al.,
Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value, 38 FiN. REV. 33 (2003). Lisa Fairfax is skeptical of
the "governance rationale" for diversity on corporate boards. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board
Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 Wis. L.
REv. 795,831-37.
78 See Fairfax, supra note 77, at 815 (noting that "very few people of color (and, for that matter,
relatively few white people) appear to meet the qualifications of a traditional board member"). Fairfax argues
that the numbers of minorities in professional, managerial, and related jobs "suggest that the available talent
pool of people of color is greater than the current representation within corporate boards suggests, and hence
that corporations should do a better job of reaching out to them." Id. at 817. Professor Fairfax concedes,
however, that the relatively small numbers are an obstacle to board diversity. See id.
79 See Betty S. Coffey & Jia Wang, Board Diversity and Managerial Control as Predictors of Corporate
Social Performance, 17 J. Bus. ETHIcs 1595 (1998); Fairfax, supra note 77, at 825 ("[Nleither the empirical
nor the anecdotal evidence appears to support the presumption that enhanced board diversity correlates with
reduced incidents of discrimination among employees and their corresponding lawsuits.").
80 Fairfax, supra note 77, at 797.
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rationales to justify board diversity "may lead to the overextension, the
marginalization, and even the devaluation of people of color."
81
Perhaps the most ambitious example of "changing the decisionmaker" in
the United States has been the drive to create independent boards of directors,
which began in earnest in the 1970s and continues today. 82 The drive has been
successful, if success is measured by the increased number of independent
boards. If success if measured by improved performance of the companies,
however, empirical evidence is lacking. 83  Indeed, with the exception of an
increased willingness to replace chief executive officers, there is no evidence
that decisions by independent boards of directors differ qualitatively from the
decisions of insider boards. 84  Nevertheless, the drive continues. Enron,
81 Id. at 854. Fairfax's arguments track those generally employed by critical scholars concerned with
"legal cooptation." In a recent article, Orly Lobel "unbundles" the cooptation critique of law and attempts to
restore a "critical optimism" to the role of law in promoting social change. See Orly Lobel, The Paradox of
Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARv. L. REV. 937
(2007).
82 For a recent survey of the debates over director independence, see Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization
of Independence (Univ. Ga. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-007, 2007), available at http://ssm.coml
abstract=968513.
83 See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-correlation Between Board Independence and Long-
Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 233 (2002):
We find evidence that low-profitability firms respond to their business troubles by following
conventional wisdom and increasing the proportion of independent directors on their boards.
There is no evidence, however, that this strategy works. Firms with more independent boards
(proxied by the fraction of independent directors minus the fraction of inside directors) do not
achieve improved profitability, and there are hints in our data that they perform worse than other
firms. This evidence suggests that the conventional wisdom on the importance of board
independence lacks empirical support. Board size also shows no consistent correlation with firm
performance, though we find hints of the negative correlation found in other studies.
The notion that independent boards of directors should improve performance depends on the
assumption that conflict-of-interest transactions are a material drag on corporate performance. But this
assumption may be misplaced. As noted by Jill Fisch:
[T]he focus on independence as a criterion for evaluating board structure may place undue
emphasis on the monitoring role of the corporate board while ignoring its management function.
Although director independence may enhance the board's ability to monitor effectively, this gain
may come at the expense of a decline in the board's management capacity. This analysis
suggests that the normative vision of independence currently embraced by the corporate
governance movement is a vision that imposes costs as well as benefits upon corporations that
respond to the reform pressure.
Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDoZo L. REV. 265, 267 (1997).
" See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114
YALE L.J. 1521, 1530 (2005) (noting that, with respect to studies of the connection between independent audit
committees and firm performance, "[n]one of these studies have found any relation between audit committee
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WorldCom, and other corporate scandals early in this decade further raised the
stakes, and director independence is a central feature in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002.85 In addition, as part of those Enron-era reforms, the New York
Stock Exchange and Nasdaq have adopted more stringent definitions of
director independence.
86
Each of the foregoing examples of changing the decisionmaker has its own
peculiar history and back story, but together they support the notion that, over
a broad swath of firms, corporate decisionmaking on matters of corporate
social responsibility is not highly responsive to changes in board composition.
Perhaps this should not be surprising, given the extent to which modem
corporations in the U.S. already take account of social considerations.
87
Certainly, corporate law endows directors with tremendous discretion to serve
the interests of all corporate stakeholders. Indeed, Lynn Stout and Margaret
Blair have made the ability of directors to satisfy non-shareholder
constituencies the distinguishing feature of their conception of boards of
directors as "mediating hierarchs," 88 and Stephen Bainbridge has asserted that
"the board of directors is not a mere agent of the shareholders, but rather is a
sui generis body-a sort of Platonic guardian-serving as the nexus for the
various contracts comprising the corporation. ' 89 Even if one were dissatisfied
with the results of director discretion, it is clear that the U.S. corporate
governance system already contains a substantial dose of "stakeholder
independence and performance, using a variety of performance measures including both accounting and
market measures as well as measures of investment strategies and productivity of long-term assets").
15 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
86 See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A (2004); NASDAQ, Inc., Marketplace Rules R.
4350(c)-(d) (2006).
87 Cf Ribstein, supra note 58, at 1459 (arguing that "long-run profits may depend significantly on
satisfying the social demands of consumers, employees and local communities").
88 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV.
247, 280-81 (1999) ("[The primary job of the board of directors of a public corporation is not to act as agents
who ruthlessly pursue shareholders' interests at the expense of employees, creditors, or other team members.
Rather, directors are trustees for the corporation itself-mediating hierarchs whose job is to balance team
members' competing interests in a fashion that keeps everyone happy enough that the productive coalition
stays together."); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate
Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 738 (2006) ("[D]irectors are better described as 'mediating hierarchs' who must
balance the competing needs and demands of shareholders, creditors, customers, suppliers, executives, rank-
and-file employees, and even the local community, in a fashion that protects specific investment in the
corporation and keeps the corporation alive, healthy, and growing.").
89 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U.
L. REv. 547, 550-51 (2003) (citation omitted).
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governance. ' 9° Thus, while changes in board composition may work marginal
changes in corporate decisionmaking, the likelihood that Professor
Greenfield's proposals would "save the world" is remote.
B. Changing the Decision Rule
Edward Bellamy was a clever man, and he anticipated the question that
would naturally occur to his readers: Would the utopian world described by Dr.
Leete require a fundamental change in human nature? In response to a similar
question asked by Julian West, Dr. Leete stated: "I don't think there has been
any change in human nature in that respect since your day. It is still so
constituted that special incentives in the form of prizes and advantages to be
gained, are requisite to call out the best endeavors of the average man in any
direction." 9' Nevertheless, the people in Dr. Leete's day seem to experience
life differently from Julian West's people. Again, from Dr. Leete:
If I were to give you, in one sentence, a key to what may seem the
mysteries of our civilization as compared with that of your age, I
should say that it is the fact that the solidarity of the race and the
brotherhood of man, which to you were but fine phrases, are, to our
thinking and feeling, ties as real and as vital as physical fraternity.
92
Professor Greenfield hopes to work a similar change in the attitudes of
directors, not by changing their fundamental nature, but by changing the
decision rule that governs their deliberations. 93  Like many before him,
Professor Greenfield criticizes the shareholder-centric focus of corporate
90 Admittedly, the extent to which corporations in the U.S. serves various stakeholders may depend in
large part on the predilections of shareholders. Cynthia Williams and John Conley provide an interesting
comparison between corporations in the U.S. and the U.K. Both countries "share a pattern of widely dispersed
share ownership," and both "have well-developed securities markets, and both depend upon similar
mechanisms to promote managerial accountability, including financial transparency, stock market valuations,
and the market for corporate control." Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The
Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493, 498 (2005). In
addition, "both exhibit a form of shareholder capitalism, under which the purpose of the corporation is to
maximize shareholder wealth." Id. Nevertheless, "institutional investors in the UK have acted, and reacted, to
bring stakeholder concerns and issues of social responsibility into the financial mainstream in a way that has
not happened in the United States." Id. at 500.
91 BELLAMY, supra note I, at 46.
92 Id. at 64. Later, Dr. Leete explains to West that the feeling of universal brotherhood became a reality
only when all classes were eliminated..
93 See Greenfield, supra note 25, at 965 (arguing against the shareholder primacy norm).
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decisionmaking. 94 His argument is straightforward and powerful: "Corporate
law should not presume, without strong arguments, to prohibit corporate
decisionmakers from taking into account the very societal interests that the
corporation is ultimately meant to serve." 95 While many corporate governance
scholars defend the shareholder primacy norm as an essential feature of the
corporate governance system,96 I prefer to respond with a shrug of the
shoulders. The problem with Professor Greenfield's argument is not that the
shareholder primacy norm is an essential foundation stone in the corporate
governance system, but that the shareholder primacy norm is both unenforced
and unenforceable. As a result, "the shareholder primacy norm may be one of
the most overrated doctrines in corporate law."
97
Shareholder primacy was the locus of the most famous debate over
corporate social responsibility, which took place in the early 1930s between
Columbia Law Professor Adolf A. Berle and Harvard Law Professor Merrick
Dodd (the "Berle-Dodd Debate"). In the wake of the stock market collapse in
1929, Berle wrote Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust and asserted in the
first sentence:
It is the thesis of this essay that all powers granted to a corporation or
to the management of a corporation, or to any group within the
corporation, whether derived from statute or charter or both, are
necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of
all the shareholders as their interest appears.
Why did Berle feel the need to defend shareholder primacy in 1931? The
conventional wisdom of today holds that the shareholder primacy norm was
well-entrenched by 1919, when the Michigan Supreme Court issued its opinion
in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,99 which contains the most-cited articulation of the
shareholder primacy norm. 1°° Indeed, in his response to Berle, Dodd cites
94 See id. For a recent example of a similar approach, see Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in
the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005), which criticizes the shareholder-centric focus of corporate
decisionmaking.
95 Greenfield, supra note 25, at 965.
96 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 89, at 577-84; David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social
Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 29-34 (1979). Larry Ribstein has recently proposed various reforms that
would enable corporations to implement partnership-like structures that would increase accountability of
managers to shareholders. See Ribstein, supra note 58, at 1476-82.
97 D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 322-23 (1998).
98 Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1049 (1931).
99 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
100 Id. at 684 ("A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end."); see also Smith, supra note 97, at
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DodgelOl and asserts, "[I]t is undoubtedly the traditional view that a
corporation is an association of stockholders formed for their private gain and
to be managed by its board of directors solely with that end in view."' 102  So
why the debate, when Berle and Dodd seem to agree that the shareholder
primacy norm applied to corporate decisionmaking?
Though Berle does not explain his motives, one might infer from his
language and from the nature of the proposals in the article that he was
attempting to lay the foundation for reforms that would improve corporate
performance during the Great Depression.'0 3 A major point of concem seemed
to be managerial self-dealing. °4  Dodd states that the motivation for Berle's
piece was "[t]he fact that managers . . . not infrequently act as though
maximum shareholder profit was not the sole object of managerial
activities. ' 05  The cases referred to by Dodd are not cases of managerial
inattention or incompetence,'°6 but cases of self-dealing.107
The problem with using shareholder primacy to focus on managerial
conflicts is that the beneficiary of the conflicted managers' duty is superfluous.
Larry Mitchell has observed:
[I]t is enough to prohibit directorial self-dealing to recognize that
directors have no legitimate financial interest in the property they
manage that would permit them to use any portion of that property to
further their own interests. Although logical, the correlative
statement that these transactions should be precluded in the interest
of the stockholders is not necessary: the older formulation focusing
315 n.186 (showing that citations to Dodge for this premise are found much more often in law review articles
than in court cases).
'01 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REV. 1145,
1146 n.3 (1932).
102 id. at 1146-47.
103 Berle seems to be preoccupied with the possibility that corporations would be hampered by "technical
rules," and he contends that such impediments would yield in the face of the shareholder primacy norm. See
Berle, supra note 98, at 1049-50.
104 For example, Berle proposes the following rule with respect to dividends: "[D]ividends must be
withheld only for a business reason: private or personal motives may not be indulged." Id. at 1060. Later in
the article, Berle asserts, "The power to acquire stock in other corporations must be so used as to tend to the
benefit of the corporation as a whole and may not be used to forward the enterprises of the managers as
individuals or to subserve special interests within or without the corporation." Id. at 1063.
105 Dodd, supra note 101, at 1147.
106 See generally Smith, supra note 97.
107 See, e.g., Dodd, supra note 101, at 1147-48 ("[I]t is undesirable, even with the laudable purpose of
giving stockholders much-needed protection against self-seeking managers, to give increased emphasis at the
present time to the view that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their
stockholders.") (emphasis added).
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on the interests of the corporation is adequate. Thus, identifying the
beneficiaries of the rule is, to establish this modest principle, of
secondary importance.1
0 8
Thus, at the foundation of the Berle-Dodd debate lies the fallacious assumption
that the role of the shareholder primacy norm is to police managerial conflicts.
Dodd seems to recognize the insignificance of the shareholder primacy norm to
the problem of discouraging managerial self-dealing because he expresses
sympathy for Berle's project, 1°9 but argues that "experiments" in the direction
of socially responsible behavior by corporate managers should not "run
counter to fundamental principles of the law of business corporations." As a
legal matter, he is surely right, as Berle conceded 20 years later.' In The
Shareholder Primacy Norm, I observed that "the universal application of the
business judgment rule makes the shareholder primacy norm virtually
unenforceable against public corporations' managers.""
1 2
If courts suddenly changed course, as urged by Professor Greenfield, could
they enforce the shareholder primacy norm? In other words, does the
shareholder primacy norm provide a tractable decision rule? 13  Economist
Michael Jensen suggests that it does not:
Value seeking tells an organization and its participants how their
success in achieving a vision or in implementing a strategy will be
assessed. But value maximizing or value seeking says nothing about
how to create a superior vision or strategy. Nor does it tell
employees or managers how to find or establish initiatives or
ventures that create value. It only tells them how we will measure
success in their activity."'
108 Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 70 TEx. L. REV. 579, 596 (1992).
109 Dodd claims to be "thoroughly in sympathy with Mr. Berle's efforts to establish a legal control which
will more effectually prevent corporate managers from diverting profit into their own pockets from those of
stockholders." Dodd, supra note 101, at 1147.
110 Dodd, supra note 101, at 1162.
111 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954).
112 D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 286 (1998). Professor
Greenfield acknowledges, "it is a contentious question as to whether directors have an enforceable duty to
maximize profit." Greenfield, supra note 25, at 964.
113 See Posting of Brayden King to CONGLOMERATE, The Problem with Shareholder Primacy,
http://www.theconglomerate.orgt2OO6/07/the-problem-wit.html (July 25, 2006) ("The problem with the
shareholder primacy norm is that it doesn't actually tell directors how they are to allocate resources. That's a
big problem for a norm that is supposed to assist decision-making and provide a legal justification for
corporate actions.").
114 Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function,
14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 16 (2001).
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Even though courts do not enforce the shareholder primacy norm, businesses
seem quite focused on maximizing profits.'" 5 Some have argued that this drive
for profit maximization is spurred in part by the "expressive effect" of the
shareholder primacy norm,116 though these arguments rest on the mistaken
assumption that the shareholder primacy norm is required to deter self-
interested behavior." 7  In any event, given that directors and officers make
their decisions in the shadow of the markets described above, the notion that an
unenforceable and unenforced legal rule is a powerful determinant of those
decisions seems almost fanciful. And Professor Greenfield's claim does not
rest on the expressive effect of the shareholder primacy norm, so I will not
belabor the point.
III. DYSTOPIA
The usual objection to utopian societies is that their members are required
to sacrifice freedom on the altar of equality. Dr. Leete assures West, however,
that "liberty is as dear as equality or fraternity" to those in latter-day Boston."
18
Bellamy's Boston of 2000 was a world without capitalists.119 In the great new
society, the consummation of the trend of capital consolidation begun by the
great monopolies of the end of the nineteenth century was the result of "the
final consolidation of the entire capital of the nation."' 20  With the benefit of
twenty-first century hindsight, Bellamy's vision is frightening:
115 See C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective
for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 101 (2002) (arguing, in reference to the 1950s, that
"[c]orporate leaders spoke of the corporation's new responsibility, but none seemed ready to abandon the
profit-maximizing and shareholder-primacy norms that had guided their actions for many years").
116 On the expressive effect of law, see Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 585 (1998); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649
(2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
117 For example, Stephen Bainbridge observes:
Because the shareholder wealth maximization norm is central to director socialization, the norm
provides a forceful reminder of where the director's loyalty lies. Even if the business judgment
rule renders its rhetoric largely unenforceable, the shareholder wealth maximization norm is an
ever-present goad. By removing the psychological constraint that the shareholder wealth
maximization norm provides, and by simultaneously exacerbating the two masters problem, we
are less likely to encourage directors to pursue the collective interests of the firm's various
constituents than to encourage directors to pursue their own self-interests.
Bainbridge, supra note 89, at 582.
118 BELLAMY, supra note 1, at 89.
119 As Dr. Leete asserts, "the nation [had] become the sole capitalist." BELLAMY, supra note 1, at 139.
But to suggest that "capitalism" exists without markets is doublespeak.
120 Id. at 27.
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The industry and commerce of the country, ceasing to be conducted
by a set of irresponsible corporations and syndicates of private
persons at their caprice and for their profit, were intrusted [sic] to a
single syndicate representing the people, to be conducted for the
common interest and for the common profit. The nation, that is to
say, organized as one great business corporation in which all other
corporations were absorbed; it became the one capitalist in the place
of all the other capitalists, the sole employer, the final monopoly in
which all previous and lesser monopolies were swallowed up, a
monopoly in the profits and economies of which all citizens
shared.... At last, strangely late in the world's history, the obvious
fact was perceived that no business is so essentially the public
business as the industry and commerce on which the people's
livelihood depends, and to entrust it to private persons to be managed
for private profit is a folly similar in kind, though vastly greater in
magnitude, to that a surrendering the functions of political
government to kings and nobles to be conducted for their personal
..- . 121
gratification.
The change was not caused by bloody revolution, but by consensus.
122
Ironically, one of the most important changes in the history of U.S. corporate
law occurred in 1888, the year that Looking Backward was first published,
when New Jersey amended its constitution to allow corporations to hold and
dispose of the stock of other corporations. 123 New Jersey was already the
leader in the competition for corporate charters, on the strength of its general
incorporation statute of 1875, but subsequent reforms in the late 1880s and
1890s strengthened New Jersey's position. On the basis of these reforms, New
Jersey became widely known as the "Mother of Corporations" or the "Traitor
State."1
24
Other states, including Delaware (in 1899), followed New Jersey's lead by
liberalizing their corporation statutes. Moreover, in 1900, the Delaware Court
of Chancery held that it was bound by the corporation precedents from the
New Jersey courts because the Delaware legislature had adopted many
passages of the New Jersey statute in ipsissimis verbis.125 Despite copying
New Jersey's statutes and cases and offering lower taxes, Delaware was unable
121 id.
122 See id. at 28 (explaining that "the whole mass of people was behind it").
123 Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate
Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 163 (1985).
124 See Charles M. Yablon, The Historical Race Competition for Corporate Charters and the Rise and
Decline of New Jersey: 1880-1910, 32 J. CoRp. L. 323, 337 (2007).
125 See Wilmington City Ry. Co. v. People's Ry. Co., 47 A. 245 (Del. Ch. 1900).
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to attract a substantial number of corporations until then-Governor of New
Jersey Woodrow Wilson succeeded in convincing the New Jersey legislature to
adopt the "Seven Sisters Acts" in 1913,126 which effectively outlawed holding
companies. Though New Jersey repealed the Seven Sisters Acts in 1917, the
damage had been done, and Delaware had established itself as the leader in the
competition for corporate charters.
As the beneficiary of this cautionary tale, Delaware wisely has avoided
radical innovations in its corporate law. As a result, most ambitious corporate
reformers have embraced federal incorporation as the only feasible route to
major reform. 127  Though Professor Greenfield has not endorsed a federal
incorporation explicitly, he refers to "U.S. corporate law" in his paper, and
whatever means he would employ to implement his reforms, the national scope
of his ambition is clear.' 28  Just as members of utopian societies may be
required to sacrifice freedom on the altar of equality, so Professor Greenfield's
proposals would require corporations to forfeit the liberal regulations
embedded in state corporate laws for a more constraining federal system. The
very real risk, indeed, the almost certain effect, of implementing his proposed
reforms would be an exodus of corporations from the United States.
The conventional objection to proposals like Professor Greenfield's is that
stakeholder governance leads to diminished accountability of corporate
managers. This so-called "two-masters problem" has been thoroughly
advanced in the existing literature,' 29  and proponents of stakeholder
126 See Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware's General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 249, 270 (1976). Wilson was a lame duck governor at the time, having been elected President of the United
States in 1912.
127 See, e.g., Nader, supra note 67. The major statutory competitor to Delaware is the Model Business
Corporation Act, which grew out of a New Deal project to draft a federal corporation act. See Ray Garrett,
History, Purpose and Summary of the Model Business Corporation Act, 6 Bus. LAW., at vii (1950).
128 Cynthia Williams argues that the terms of the debate over corporate social responsibility have changed
with globalization, which "undermines the ability of sovereign nations to impose substantive, proactive limits
on economic actors such as transnational corporations and capital market participants." Cynthia A. Williams,
Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 725 (2002).
This insight is relevant to any proposal relating to corporate law, including Professor Greenfield's and,
presumably, Professor Williams's call for expanded "corporate social transparency." See id. at 777; see also
Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 1197 (1999).
129 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 38, 70 (1991); Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595,
640-65 (1997); Stephen N. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to
Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1435-38 (1993); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis
of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties,
21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 31-36 (1991).
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governance have answered the charge. 130 But that debate is merely a sideshow
to the larger concern over the dystopian potential of corporate law. While the
"two-masters problem" focuses on the potential for managerial self-dealing,
Professor Greenfield's proposal would be problematic even in a world without
self-dealing.
The crucial point of departure for this section is the following
incontrovertible fact: Professor Greenfield's vision of utopia would require
boards of directors to make decisions that sacrifice shareholder value in favor
of value for non-shareholder constituencies. When boards of directors are able
to enhance employee welfare, make the environment cleaner, or improve
human rights throughout the world without impairing shareholder value, they
often do it. This is not "corporate social responsibility," but good
management. And the failure to pursue such strategies would be a problem of
managerial incompetence, not a problem of improper incentives.131
Professor Greenfield's proposals to change the decisionmaker and change
the decision rule would have the effect of shifting power and attention away
from shareholders and toward non-shareholder constituencies. As Larry
Ribstein has observed, "[S]hifting power to stakeholders solves the problem of
shareholder opportunism to stakeholders by creating a potentially more serious
problem of stakeholder opportunism to shareholders."'1 32 The inevitable result
would be an increase in the cost of public equity capital that, in turn, might
prompt many companies to search for a more hospitable host for incorporation.
The present trickle of stock expatriations, motivated by the potential for tax
savings,' 33 could become a flood.
Victor Fleischer has observed that stock expatriations are an example of
"regulatory-cost engineering," and he asserts that "[t]he puzzle is not why
inversion deals take place, but rather why we see so few."' 134 Using the aborted
130 Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate
Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 958-59 (1993); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A
Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Constituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. REV. 579, 589 (1992).
131 For a similar point, see Henry Manne, First Lecture, in THE MODERN CORPORATION AND SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 4-5 (1972).
132 Ribstein, supra note 58, at 1440.
133 Such stock expatriations include McDermott (Panama), Helen of Troy (Bermuda), Tyco (Bermuda),
Everest Reinsurance Holdings (Bermuda), Fruit of the Loom (Cayman Islands), PX Re (Bermuda), Transocean
Sedco Forex (Cayman Islands), Applied Power (Bermuda), Accenture (Bermuda), Foster Wheeler (Bermuda),
Ingersoll-Rand (Bermuda), and Cooper Industries (Bermuda).
134 Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Structures, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1581, 1621 (2006).
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expatriation proposal of Stanley Works as a case study, Professor Fleischer
hypothesizes that "[b]randing may be part of the answer."' 135  If Professor
Fleischer were right about the constraining effect of branding, the predicted
flood of expatriations that would otherwise follow implementation of Professor
Greenfield's proposals might be muted. Nevertheless, demand for
incorporation within the U.S. is not perfectly inelastic, and at some level,
increased regulatory costs would cause corporations to flee. The recent debate
surrounding the effects of the Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act of 2002-"Sarbanes-Oxley"-suggests that the tipping
point for incorporations may not be far away.136 While that debate has not yet
come to a resolution, shifts in the patterns of cross-listings' 37 away from the
U.S. and toward Europe have reminded us of the existence of a global market
for regulation. 138  Professor Greenfield's proposals would drive that lessonhome with unambiguous force.
CONCLUSION
Professor Greenfield's central claim is that corporate law is broken because
it is shareholder-centric, and that corporate law could be improved by
135 id.
136 Empirical work to date suggests that Sarbanes-Oxley has improved the quality of financial audits, thus
increasing investor confidence. See John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21
J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 106-07 (2007) (describing empirical studies on the benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley). But even
the most ardent supporters of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act admit that it imposes substantial compliance costs. The
focus of the debate, therefore, is whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act produces net benefits to investors. The
resolution of this debate remains elusive. See id. at 107 ("No methodology yet developed permits summing
the benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley into dollar amounts that could be compared meaningfully to rough estimates of
its costs, which ... are substantial. Thus, whether the legislation produced net benefits remains unclear.").
Nevertheless, there is evidence from cross-listed companies that the costs of Sarbanes-Oxley to investors
outweigh the benefits. See Kate Litvak, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Cross-Listing Premium, 105 MICH. L. REV.
1857 (2007); Kate Litvak, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-U.S. Companies Cross-Listed in the
U.S., 13 J. CORP. FINANCE 195 (2007).
137 See Joseph D. Piotroski & Suraj Srinivasan, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Flow of International
Listings (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=
956987 ("[Tlhe frequency of foreign listings on the NYSE and NASDAQ has fallen by nearly 63% in the four-
year period following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, and that this decline cannot be fully explained by
differences in market conditions before and after the Act. In contrast, the frequency of foreign listings on the
LSE has more than doubled since the Act, with the increase being driven by the nearly seven-fold increase in
foreign listings on the LSE's AIM."); see also INTERtM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS
REGULATION (Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/lI .30Committee-interim_
ReportREV2.pdf
138 See generally Larry E. Ribstein & Erin A. O'Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL.
L. REV. (2008).
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expanding its borders to include non-shareholder constituencies of the
corporation. At the heart of this "progressive" vision lies the notion that
corporate law matters to issues of distributional equity among various
corporate constituencies. A similar motivation animated Edward Bellamy's
novel, Looking Backward, and the solutions proposed by Bellamy and
Professor Greenfield also are similar: change the decisionmaker and change
the decision rule.
In response to Professor Greenfield's challenge, I contend that corporate
law does not matter in the way that he claims because powerful markets
constrain corporate decisionmaking. If Professor Greenfield somehow
succeeded in materially changing the content of corporate decisions, he would
sacrifice potential shareholder value in favor of value for non-shareholder
constituencies. In the process, Professor Greenfield's vision of corporate law
would destroy much of the good that corporations have done.
